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Commercial Transportation
by Madeline E. McNeeley,* Yvonne S. Godfrey,** T. Peyton
Bell,*** Elizabeth M. Brooks,**** and Stephen G. Lowry*****
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial transportation involves all of the significant forms of
passenger and freight transportation across the United States. This
Article surveys significant judicial, regulatory, and legislative
developments in commercial-transportation law in the Eleventh Circuit
during the period from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019.
The first three areas discussed here are subject to heavy federal
regulation due to their far-reaching effects on interstate commerce:
trucking and other commercial motor vehicles, aviation, and railroads.
This Article also touches on two additional issues: passenger
transportation for hire (i.e., livery and rideshare services) and the
development of autonomous-vehicle technology. While these issues are
regulated primarily at the state and local levels, they interact with
federal law in important ways, and autonomous-vehicle technology is
poised to face ever more extensive federal regulation as it permeates
throughout ground-based commercial transportation.
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II. TRUCKING AND OTHER COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES
The United States Department of Transportation's Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) was established on January 1,
2000,1 to regulate commercial motor vehicles by "consider[ing] the
assignment and maintenance of safety as the highest priority,
recognizing the clear intent, encouragement, and dedication of Congress
to the furtherance of the highest degree of safety in motor carrier
transportation."2 More specifically, the FMCSA is charged with
enforcing federal laws and regulations, and particularly the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs).3 The FMCSRs "are
applicable to all employers, employees, and commercial motor vehicles
that transport property or passengers in interstate commerce." 4
In addition to complying with the FMCSRs, commercial motor
vehicle operators must comply with state and local laws and
regulations, including obtaining and maintaining a commercial driver's
license (CDL).5 Although issued by individual states, CDLs are
regulated nationwide by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of
1999.6
A. Regulation

05/29/2020 07:30:56

1. Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–159, 113 Stat.
1748 (1999) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 113).
2. 49 U.S.C. § 113(b).
3. 49 C.F.R. §§ 350–99 (2017).
4. 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(a)(1) (2017).
5. 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(b) (2017); 49 C.F.R. § 383.3(a) (2017).
6. Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748.
7. Limitations on the Issuance of Commercial Driver's Licenses With a Hazardous
Materials Endorsement, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,029 (Oct. 1, 2019).
8. Lifetime Disqualification for Human Trafficking, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,335 (July 23,
2019).
9. Pub. L. No. 115-106, 131 Stat. 2265 (2018) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31310(d)(2)).
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Most of the regulatory developments in 2019 affecting commercial
motor vehicles (CMVs) addressed driver qualification and training
requirements. On October 31, 2019, the FMCSA finalized a rule
prohibiting states from "issuing, renewing, upgrading, or transferring a
hazardous materials endorsement on a CDL [commercial driver's
license] unless TSA [conducts a security assessment and] has
determined that the holder of the CDL does not pose a security risk." 7
Similarly, a new rule went into effect on September 23, 2019,8 that
enables the 2018 "No Human Trafficking on Our Roads Act." 9 Pursuant
to the Act and the amended regulation, any individual who uses a CMV
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in committing a felony involving a severe form of human trafficking is
banned for life from ever again operating a CMV.10 The rule takes its
definition of "severe forms of [human] trafficking" from the existing
definition codified in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act at 22 U.S.C.
§ 7102(11).11 On May 6, 2019, the entry-level driver training (ELDT)
regulations, called the "Minimum Training Requirements for EntryLevel Commercial Motor Vehicle Operators," 12 were amended.13 The
amendment to the training adopts a new Class A CDL curriculum that
reduces the training time and costs for commercial drivers who already
have a Class B CDL.14 Finally, the FMCSA issued a rule extending the
date for mandatory compliance with the 2016 rule requiring states to
request information from the Commercial Driver's License Drug and
Alcohol Clearinghouse about individuals before completing CDL
transactions.15 Mandatory compliance was due to begin on January 6,
2020, but the FMCSA delayed that deadline to January 6, 2023, while
providing that states may begin voluntarily complying as early as
January 6, 2020.16
In other developments, the FMCSA amended provisions to its
hours-of-service (HOS) requirements for drivers of property-carrying
commercial motor vehicles.17 In particular, the amendment removed a
requirement that a thirty-four-hour restart include two periods between
1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. and limited use of a restart to once every 168
hours.18 Another final rule took effect on October 15, 2019, regarding
the lease of passenger-carrying CMVs and the interchange of
passenger-carrying CMVs between motor carriers. 19 The rule,
established in 49 C.F.R. § 390.403,20 narrowed the definition of "lease"
in the federal regulations by excluding certain contracts and other
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 26 Side A
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10. Lifetime Disqualification for Human Trafficking, 84 Fed. Reg. at 35,335; 49
C.F.R. § 383.51(b)(10) (2019).
11. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11) (2019).
12. 81 Fed. Reg. 88,732 (Dec. 8, 2016).
13. Id.; 49 C.F.R. § 380.707 (2019).
14. 49 C.F.R. § 380 (2019).
15. Extension of Compliance Date for States' Query of the Drug and Alcohol
Clearinghouse, 84 Fed. Reg. 68,052 (Dec. 13, 2o19).
16. 49 C.F.R. § 382.725(a) (2019); 49 C.F.R § 383.73(b)(10), (c)(10), (d)(9), (e)(8), and
(f)(4) (2019); 49 C.F.R. § 384.235 (2019).
17. Hours of Service of Drivers—Restart Provisions, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,077 (Sept. 12,
2019).
18. Id. at 48,079.
19. Lease and Interchange of Vehicles; Motor Carriers of Passengers, 84 Fed. Reg.
40,272 (Aug 14, 2019).
20. 49 C.F.R. § 390.403 (2019).
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agreements between motor carriers of passengers that have active
passenger-carrier operating authority registrations with FMCSA, thus
reducing the number of passenger carriers and passenger-carrying
CMV trips that are subject to the requirement of entering into a lease
and interchange agreement.21 This same rule suspended 49 C.F.R.
§ 390.522 indefinitely.23
B. Recent Cases

Id.
49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (2019).
Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, 84 Fed. Reg. at 40,293.
923 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1298, 1301.
Id. at 1299.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
published an opinion in 2019 addressing a litigant's standing to sue the
federal government—here, the FMCSA. In Flat Creek Transportation,
LLC v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,24 a commercial
trucking company sued the FMCSA alleging it "had unfairly targeted
[the trucking company] for compliance reviews and used an unsound
methodology."25 The appellate court held the company's allegations did
not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution.26
The FMCSA uses a rating methodology to quantify carriers' safetyfitness performance.27 Included in this assessment is a review of seven
metrics: "(1) unsafe driving, (2) fatigued driving, (3) driver fitness, (4)
controlled-substance and alcohol usage, (5) vehicle maintenance, (6)
hazardous-material compliance, and (7) crash history."28 If a
non-passenger carrier has not received an onsite investigation and
scores high in two out of the seven categories, it receives a "High Risk"
designation, which can lead to more in-depth investigations and
compliance reviews.29 Here, Flat Creek claimed it received false and
misleading scores and was subject to "an unusually high number of
[compliance review] interventions," because the FMCSA was prejudiced
against it.30 Importantly, however, after the FMCSA's compliance
reviews, the carrier never had a review that resulted in less than a
"Satisfactory" rating—the highest possible rating.31 The carrier filed a
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(1) whether the movant was prejudiced as a result of the destruction
of evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the practical
importance of the evidence; (4) whether the alleged spoliator acted in

Id.
Id. at 1300–01.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id.
No. 5:18-CV-145 (MTT), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115198, *1 (M.D. Ga. July 11,
Id. at *2–4.
Id. at *6.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
2019).
38.
39.
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declaratory judgment action seeking injunctive relief to prevent FMCSA
from conducting more investigations and compliance reviews of it. 32
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the carrier had suffered no
injury-in-fact, as required for Article III standing, because its final
reviews all resulted in a "Satisfactory" rating. 33 Flat Creek additionally
argued that FMCSA would use future reviews as a pretext to fabricate
regulatory violations and shut down its operations, but the court
determined the risk of Flat Creek being designated a "High Risk"
carrier in a future assessment and subjected to increased likelihood of
performance reviews was too conjectural and hypothetical to constitute
an injury.34 The court also held the threat of a future "High Risk"
designation was not sufficiently imminent, as FMCSA regulations
prohibited the agency from even conducting another assessment for
another eighteen months after its most recent onsite inspection. 35
Because there was no concrete and imminent injury, the carrier lacked
Article III standing and the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to address
its claims.36
Although no other notable opinions were published in 2019 related to
commercial motor vehicles, the Middle District of Georgia issued an
unpublished opinion relevant to determining whether and how to
impose sanctions for spoliation of evidence. In Allen v. Sanchez,37 an
individual whose vehicle was struck by a truck driver sent a spoliation
letter to the trucking company shortly after the wreck directing it to
preserve driver logs, inspection reports, and other evidence. The
plaintiffs then requested those documents during discovery, but the
defendant failed to produce them and made only a partial production
after the plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions. 38 The district court
found that the defendant had, indeed, spoliated the evidence. 39 To
determine whether sanctions were warranted, the court went on to
apply a five-factor test:
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good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if expert testimony
about the evidence is not excluded.40

The court found the first three factors were established as a matter of
law and the fifth factor was not at issue in this situation, but concluded
the question of whether the defendants acted in bad faith was a
question of fact for the jury.41 The court ruled that the jury would be
tasked with determining whether the defendant acted in bad faith when
it spoliated the evidence and that such spoliation can give rise to a
rebuttable presumption that the evidence was harmful to the
defendant's position.42
III. AVIATION
Federal courts and statutes shape most of the legal landscape
regarding commercial aviation, even at the state level. Regulations
promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 43 as well as
international treaties,44 provide the structure for almost every aspect of
commercial aviation and preempt state or local attempts that may
conflict or be inconsistent with that structure.
On the regulatory front, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 201845
resulted in new proposed regulations and rulemaking in 2019, while
international environmental efforts have also begun to take shape. On
the judicial side, cases decided in the Eleventh Circuit that affect
commercial aviation continue to demonstrate the significant effect
federal legislation, regulations, and even advisory opinions can have on
the outcome of civil cases.
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 27 Side B
05/29/2020 07:30:56

40. Id. at *6–7 (quoting Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir.
2005)).
41. Id. at *8-10.
42. Id. at *10.
43. Robin C. Larner, 15 Ga. Jur. Personal Injury and Torts § 29:25 (2020) ("Federal
aviation regulations have been promulgated to regulate virtually every aspect of aviation
in the United States; these regulations are duly published in accordance with law in the
Code of Federal Regulations, and they have the force of law.").
44. The United Nations treaty regarding international carriage by air, the Montreal
Convention (which replaced its predecessor, the Warsaw Convention), sets forth uniform
rules for claims that arise out of incidents that occur during international air
transportation. See Marotte v. Amer. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002)
("[T]he Warsaw convention is the exclusive mechanism of recovery for personal injuries
suffered on board an aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking from an
airplane." (citation omitted)); Ugaz v. Amer. Airlines, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360
(S.D. Fla. 2008) ("The Montreal Convention entered into force in the United States on
November 4, 2003 and superseded the Warsaw Convention.").
45. Pub. L. No. 115-254 (H.R. Res. 302), 132 Stat. 3186 (2016).
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A. Legislation and Regulation

05/29/2020 07:30:56

46. Id.; 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–30.
47. Pub. L. No. 115-254 (H.R. Res. 302), 132 Stat. 3186.
48. Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 341, 132 Stat. at 3284–87; 49 U.S.C. § 44801–02.
49. Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 348, 132 Stat. at 3297; 49 U.S.C. § 44808.
50. 84 Fed. Reg. 72,438-523 (Dec. 31, 2019).
51. Id. at 72439.
52. Id.
53. See Jordan Labkon & Barry Moss, CORSIA Creates Complexities for Aviation
Financiers, 32(1) AIR & SPACE LAW. 4 (2019).
54. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (noting that
the United States became a member of the ICAO by virtue of being a party to the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180 (1944)).
55. Labkon & Moss, supra note 53, at 4.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 28 Side A

As background, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 was enacted on
October 5, 2018, creating significant changes in commercial aviation
regulation.46 The stated purpose of the Act was to reauthorize federal
aviation programs, to improve aircraft safety certification processes,
and for other purposes.47 Of relevance to the 2019 commercial aviation
landscape, the Act set forth new conditions for the recreational and
commercial use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), more commonly
referred to as drones.48 In particular, the Act required the FAA to
develop, within one year, a rule to allow package delivery by small
drones.49
On December 31, 2019, the FAA published its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for remote identification of UAS/drones in the Federal
Register.50 The proposed rule contemplates compliance with remote
identification requirements within the next three years. 51 The remote
identification requirements are considered to be an essential building
block to allow the further development of an "unmanned traffic
management ecosystem."52
On the international and environmental fronts, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) implemented a carbon-offsetting
scheme, referred to as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for
International Aviation (CORSIA), which went into effect on January 1,
2019.53 The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations of which
the United States is a member.54 CORSIA will require most of ICAO's
member states, including the United States, to implement an emissions
monitoring plan into their national laws. 55
The ICAO also increased the monetary limits of liability for claims
relating to passenger injury, delay, baggage, and cargo for international

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 28 Side B
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travel that falls under the Montreal Convention. 56 The increased limits
became effective as of December 28, 2019. 57
B. Recent Cases

05/29/2020 07:30:56

56. 2019 Revised Limits of Liability Under the Montreal Convention of 1999,
https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/2019_Revised_Limits_of_Liability_Under_the
_Montreal_Convention_1999.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
57. Id.
58. 385 F. Supp. 3d. 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
59. Id. at 1342–43.
60. Fla. Stat. § 501.201–501.213.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1961–68.
62. Dolan, 385 F. Supp. 3d. at 1342.
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In the past year, only one case within the Eleventh Circuit was
decided that may directly impact commercial aviation, in large part due
to the already extensive federal regulation in that area. The case
discussed below illustrates how federal and state legislation interact to
define and restrict the liability of commercial aviation providers, even
in the context of claims for unfair practices and deceptive trade, unjust
enrichment, and federal racketeering. Accordingly, knowledge of federal
aviation law and how it will likely shape litigation is essential, even in
cases not directly pertaining to commercial aviation.
In Dolan v. JetBlue Airways Corporation,58 Milita Barbara Dolan
filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, seeking to bring claims on
behalf of herself and a putative class regarding "trip insurance" sold as
a part of booking air travel on JetBlue Airways Corporation's website.
Dolan's claims centered around JetBlue's failure to disclose that it
received a portion of the fee paid for trip insurance. Specifically, Dolan
alleged that JetBlue "dupes" its customers into believing that the
amount charged for trip insurance is paid to a third party in exchange
for the insurance coverage, when, in fact, a portion of every trip
insurance policy sold is paid as a kickback to JetBlue. Dolan alleged
that the kickbacks were illegal, as JetBlue received commissions from
insurance policies without a license to do so, the third-party insurance
companies concealed the unlicensed commissions on state regulatory
filings, the commissions paid to JetBlue were disguised as "marketing"
or "advertising" fees, and there was no correlation between the actual
risk being underwritten and the cost of the policy.59 Dolan set forth
claims under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
(FDUTPA)60 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO),61 and she also alleged an unjust enrichment claim under
Florida law.62
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JetBlue moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the
Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)63 preempted Dolan's state law claims
under the FDUTPA and for unjust enrichment, and that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act64 barred her RICO claims.65 District court
Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. denied JetBlue's motion in large part and
granted it to a limited extent.66
As background, the ADA preempts state laws that are "related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air
transportation."67 The ADA, enacted in 1978, was designed "to ensure
that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of
their own."68 A state law is considered "related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier" when it has "a connection with, or reference to,
airline 'rates, routes, or services.'"69 The term "related to" is intended to
have a "broad scope" and "expansive sweep."70 However, the Eleventh
Circuit has previously explained that the ADA does not "result in the
pre-emption of virtually everything an airline does"; rather, the ADA's
preemptive effect is "limited to the bargained-for aspects of airline
operations over which carriers compete."71
In Dolan, JetBlue argued that the unjust enrichment and FDUTPA
claims arise from "an offer of sale of optional travel insurance during
the ticket purchasing process," and that, therefore, an airline rate,
route, or service is implicated, triggering ADA preemption.72 The
district court disagreed.73
The court in Dolan focused its analysis on whether the offering of
trip insurance relates to the "service of an air carrier." 74 As set forth by
the Eleventh Circuit, for a particular service to be deemed a "service of
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 29 Side A
05/29/2020 07:30:56

63. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1997).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1948).
65. Dolan, 385 F. Supp. 3d. at 1342.
66. Id.
67. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
68. Amerijet Int'l, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 627 F. App'x 744, 747 (11th Cir. 2015)
(unpublished) (quotation omitted).
69. Id.; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).
70. Amerijet Int'l, Inc., 627 App'x at 747 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 384).
71. Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis in original); see also Amerijet Int'l, Inc., 627 F. App'x at 749 (holding that a
"service" under the ADA "must fit within the limited range of services over which airlines
compete" and must be provided as part of a "bargained-for exchange . . . between an air
carrier and its consumers").
72. Dolan, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–45.
73. Id. at 1346.
74. Id. at 1345.
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75. Amerijet Int'l Inc., 627 F. App'x at 747–49.
76. Id. at 749.
77. Id.
78. Dolan, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1345.
79. Id. (quoting Branche, 342 F.3d at 1258).
80. Dolan, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1346.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
85. Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1220 (11th Cir. 2001)
(quotation and alterations omitted).
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an air carrier" under the ADA, three elements are required.75 First, the
service must fall within the "limited range of services over which
airlines compete."76 Second, it must be bargained for, and third, the
bargain must occur between an air carrier and its consumers. 77
Based on this test, the court found that JetBlue failed to establish
the first element, as there was no indication in the record that trip
insurance is a service over which airlines compete.78 The court rejected
JetBlue's argument that, because other carriers offer trip insurance, the
sale of trip insurance was "part of the customer's experience of air
travel or considered in evaluating the quality of their flight." 79 In fact,
the court noted, "Providing a mechanism whereby consumers can insure
airline-ticket purchases through a third party is not unique or limited
to the airline industry."80 Instead, perhaps echoing the complaint of
many modern travelers, the court in Dolan observed, "[I]t appears
JetBlue's offering of trip insurance merely serves to extract extra
revenue for the airline from customers who have already decided to
purchase a ticket . . . ."81 Accordingly, the court declined to dismiss the
plaintiff's claims as based on ADA preemption. 82
Next, the district court addressed JetBlue's argument that Dolan's
claims were covered by Florida's Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act,
and therefore, the McCarran-Ferguson Act applied.83 The
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that, unless Congress enacts
legislation that "specifically relates to the business of insurance," the
business of insurance and its regulation are left to the states.84 Thus,
Dolan's federal RICO claims would be barred if: (1) the federal statute
at issue did not specifically relate to the business of insurance; (2) the
state statute implicated was enacted to regulate the business of
insurance; and (3) application of the federal statute "would invalidate,
impair, or supersede the state statute."85 Agreeing that many of Dolan's
claims pertained to insurance regulation under Florida law, the district
court granted JetBlue's motion to dismiss only to the extent that
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Dolan's claims regarding insurance were covered by Florida's Unfair
Insurance Trade Practices Act.86
Finally, the court in Dolan addressed the plaintiff's FDUTPA, RICO,
and unjust enrichment claims, and found that the plaintiff sufficiently
alleged those claims to the extent they were not covered by state
insurance regulation.87 As the court observed, many of Dolan's claims
centered on JetBlue's "unearned, undisclosed, and in fact, concealed,
kickbacks and its alleged fraudulent representation that the price the
consumer paid was not grossly inflated by amounts received by
JetBlue—allegations unrelated to any insurance-based claims."88
Accordingly, the court denied JetBlue's motion to dismiss those claims
in their entirety.89
Notably, the court in Dolan emphasized that it made its findings
under the motion-to-dismiss standard and the record before it.90 Thus,
the ultimate outcome of Dolan and its potential effect on Eleventh
Circuit law and airlines offering trip insurance remains to be seen.
IV. RAILROADS
Congress passed no new legislation in 2019 affecting railroad
transportation, but the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) made
several notable changes to the regulatory landscape. In the judicial
realm, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case involving interpretation
of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA),91 continuing the recent
series of cases addressing the interaction of taxation and railroads.
A. Regulation
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86. Dolan, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1350.
87. Id. at 1350–55.
88. Id. at 1349–50.
89. Id. at 1350. The district court also granted JetBlue's motion to dismiss a portion
of Dolan's nationwide class allegations, finding that the FDUTPA and unjust-enrichment
claims pertained only to actions occurring within Florida, and were thus improper for
nationwide class certification. Id. The court determined, however, that Dolan's class
allegations based on the federal RICO statute were not subject to dismissal. Id.
90. Id. at 1350.
91. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3231–3241 (2014).
92. 49 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1976).
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The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) amended the Railroad
Noise Emission Compliance regulations at 49 C.F.R. part 210 92 in 2019
to eliminate the requirement that a permanent badge or tag be
displayed on the cabs of locomotives for the purpose of certifying that
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93. Id.
94. 40 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2019); Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234.
95. 41 Fed. Reg. 49183, 49,183-84 (Nov. 8, 1976).
96. 49 C.F.R. pt. 210.27 (1976).
97. Hazardous Materials: Oil Spill Response Plans and Information Sharing for HighHazard Flammable Trains, 84 Fed. Reg. 6,910-01 (Feb. 28, 2019).
98. Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
99. 84 Fed. Reg. at 6,910-01.
100. Id. at 6,939-01.
101. Id. at 6,944-01.
102. Train Crew Staffing, 84 Fed. Reg. 24,735 (May 29, 2019).
103. Train Crew Staffing, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,918 (Mar. 15, 2016).
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the locomotive is compliant with noise emission standards. 93 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated these standards
in 40 C.F.R. part 201, pursuant to the Noise Control Act of 1972. 94 The
FRA collaborated with the EPA at the time to develop regulations in 49
C.F.R. part 210 for the purpose of ensuring railroad compliance with
noise emission standards.95 The regulations required locomotives built
after 1979 to attach a permanent badge or tag in the cab of the
locomotive to display results of a noise emission certification test. 96 But,
effective April 15, 2019, the FRA found this obligation irrelevant, and it
is now no longer mandated.
Additionally, a final rule was issued to revise and clarify the
requirements for comprehensive oil spill response plans. 97 The Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), along with
the Department of Transportation (DOT), and in consultation with the
FRA, jointly cooperated pursuant to the Fixing America's Surface
Transportation Act of 2015 (FAST Act) 98 to "provide regulatory
flexibility and improve response readiness to mitigate effects of rail
accidents and incidents involving petroleum oil and HHFTs
[high-hazard flammable trains]."99 Effective April 1, 2019, the rule
requires that rail carriers operating high-hazard flammable trains
(HHFTs) must notify the appropriate state and federal agencies, and it
requires railroads subject to the regulation to prepare and submit an oil
spill response plan for approval by PHMSA. 100 Although the number of
HHFTs operating in the United States is low, this regulation signifies
an important avenue of protection for not only the environment but the
public at large.101
Perhaps the most significant development from the FRA during this
survey period was its decision to withdraw a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking published on March 15, 2016. 102 The proposed rule103 arose
after a variety of investigations into rail safety issues following two
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major rail accidents in 2013.104 The FRA was concerned that "as
railroads implement positive train control (PTC) and other technologies,
they may expand use of less than two-person crews on operations
without considering safety risks or implementing risk-mitigating
actions that FRA believes are necessary." 105 The proposed rule would
have required at least two crewmembers for all rail operations and
would have established "minimum requirements for the roles and
responsibilities of the second train crewmember on a moving train, and
promote[d] safe and effective teamwork." 106 On May 29, 2019, however,
the FRA withdrew the proposed rule, claiming the investigations
following the 2013 accidents lacked any conclusion that the number of
crewmembers present on the trains had any correlation to the
accidents.107
B. Recent Cases
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104. Id. at 13,921.
105. Id. at 13,919.
106. Id. at 13,958.
107. 84 Fed. Reg. 24,735, 24,739.
108. See Madeline E. McNeeley et al., Commercial Transportation, 2018 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 70 MERCER L. REV. 923, 935–36 (2019).
109. 139 S. Ct. 893 (2019).
110. Id. at 895.
111. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (1939).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 896.
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The issue of taxation under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA)
has been a contested issue in recent years.108 In BNSF Railway
Company v. Loos,109 the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmatively answered the question of whether a railroad's payment to
an employee for working time lost due to an on-the-job injury is taxable
compensation under the RRTA. 110 Respondent Michael Loos sued
petitioner BNSF Railway Company after he was injured while working
at BNSF's railyard, alleging violations of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA)111 and the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). A
jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $126,212.76,
delineating $30,000 of the total amount for wages the plaintiff lost
during the time he was unable to work. Defendant BNSF argued that a
percentage of the $30,000 amount, $3,765, should be withheld in order
to cover taxes under the RRTA. 112 The plaintiff disagreed, arguing that
the meaning of "'compensation' under the RRTA does not include
payments made to compensate for an injury." 113 The district court and

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 31 Side B

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[3] COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION CP (DO NOT DELETE)

964

MERCER LAW REVIEW

5/20/2020 8:28 AM

[Vol. 71

the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, but Justice Ginsburg, in
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, did not. 114 In a classic
example of statutory interpretation and stare decisis, she relied on the
Court's prior holdings in Social Security Board v. Nierotko 115 and
United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.,116 as well as the definition of
"compensation" within the RRTA, determining that it is textually
similar to the definition of "wages" under the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) 117 and the Social Security Act (SSA).118 In
those prior cases, the Court had concluded that a backpay award counts
as wages "because it compensates for the 'loss of wages which the
employee suffered from the employer's wrong.'" 119 Justice Ginsburg
concluded that "compensation" under the RRTA similarly "encompasses
not simply pay for active service but, in addition, pay for periods of
absence from active service—provided that the remuneration in
question stems from the 'employer–employee relationship.'"120
V. OTHER ISSUES
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327 U.S. 358, 359 (1946).
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Loos, 139 S. Ct. at 899.
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
McNeeley et al., Commercial Transportation, 2017 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 69
MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1098–1100 (2018) (discussing Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., 263
F. Supp. 3d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2017), and Lamour v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-21449, slip
op., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29706 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2017)).
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Fewer legal developments transpired in the Eleventh Circuit with
respect to regulation of rideshare companies (also known as
transportation network entities or transportation network companies)
and livery (taxicab and limousine) services, which remain primarily
state and local matters at present. Notable federal decisions in 2019
focused primarily on the scope of the arbitration provisions ridesharing
companies include in their mobile apps' terms of service. Readers of the
2017 edition of this survey may recall a discussion of two Southern
District of Florida orders that compelled arbitration of Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)121 disputes between rideshare company Uber and
its drivers.122 Those orders determined that even the threshold question
of whether the FLSA claims were arbitrable was itself subject to
arbitration under the terms of the contract. 123 In 2019, the courts
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applied this principle to require arbitration of the arbitrability of
another FLSA dispute124 and extended it to compel arbitration of
whether a customer was required to arbitrate his claims that Uber
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 125 by sending him
unwanted text messages.126 Notably, these orders compelling
arbitration are effectively unreviewable. The FLSA plaintiff in Gray v.
Uber, Inc.,127 attempted to appeal, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because an order
compelling arbitration and staying the case "is not final or immediately
appealable."128 These cases continue the worrying trend of forcing
individuals to give up their rights to judicial review of their legal claims
in favor of secretive private arbitration proceedings.
Likewise, the development of autonomous-vehicle technology
(sometimes referred to as an automated driving system or self-driving
vehicle) is still regulated primarily by state and local governments, to
the extent it is being regulated at all. As the technology comes ever
closer to commercial viability, however, federal actors are continuing to
consider how current laws and regulations might need to be adapted to
anticipate the deployment of these systems in freight and passenger
transportation vehicles. To that end, Congress appropriated funds for
Fiscal Year 2020 to the Department of Transportation for "behavioral
research on Automated Driving Systems and Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems and improving consumer responses to safety
recalls" and to "establish a Highly Automated Systems Safety Center of
Excellence within the Department of Transportation, in order to have a
Department of Transportation workforce capable of reviewing,
assessing, and validating the safety of automated technologies." 129
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124. Gray v. Uber, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1245–46 (M.D. Fla. 2019), appeal
dismissed, No. 19-11576-F, 2019 WL 3408912 (11th Cir. June 18, 2019). Not all
transportation providers have drafted their arbitration provisions as broadly and,
consequently, not all have had Uber's success at forcing FLSA claims into arbitration. In
Brandt v. Gasolinera, Inc., the Southern District of Florida denied a limousine company's
attempt to compel arbitration of its driver's FLSA claim. No. 18-80472-CIV, 2019 WL
3890330, at *2–*3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2019).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2019).
126. Schuster v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 8:18-CV-2389-T-35JSS, 2019 WL 545441, at *1–
*3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2019).
127. No. 19-11576-F, 2019 WL 3408912, at *1 (11th Cir. June 18, 2019).
128. Id.
129. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat.
2534 (2019).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As this Article illustrates, commercial-transportation law involves an
often-complex interaction of state and federal laws and reaches into
wide-ranging areas of American life, from employment to the
environment to the right to redress of grievances in the civil justice
system. Staying well informed about the laws and regulations affecting
commercial transportation is indispensable for practitioners across
legal practice areas.
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